It was Saturday, July 27, 1776.
George Washington wanted the option to move against the British around New York. Most of the reinforcements Congress had authorized were not there.
The Flying Camp Congress intended to hold 10,000 men had “but a little more than 3000,” Washington told Congress in a July 27 letter.
Eight more ships had been reported approaching Sandy Hook. British warships and tenders remained in the Hudson. Washington had row galleys, fire ships and channel obstructions underway, but the mobile force that could support an offensive was arriving too slowly.
If the Flying Camp came in and the enemy remained in place, Washington wrote, he would “make some Efforts to annoy them” without exposing New York’s defenses or placing too much at risk.
The shortage reached beyond militia delays. Washington warned that a $10 bounty was too low to persuade men to enlist for three years and said he wished Congress had offered land.
Congress had declared its confidence in Washington’s judgment. On July 27, he showed the limits of what judgment could accomplish without soldiers.
The DX Brief
- Washington reported that the 10,000-man Flying Camp had only a little more than 3,000 troops.
- He said he would consider action against the British if the remaining troops arrived and New York’s posts could stay protected.
- Eight ships were reported approaching Sandy Hook as British warships and tenders remained in the Hudson.
- Washington credited militia vigilance with preventing British landings and limiting damage, though the enemy plundered and burned one poor farmer’s cottage.
- He warned that the $10 bounty was too low to attract men for three-year enlistments and renewed his support for a land bounty.
- Two Connecticut row galleys had arrived, another was expected and fire ships and channel obstructions remained under construction.
- Washington’s General Orders rebuked officers who had grown remiss in supervising fatigue and other duty.
- Congress was not in session. It had adjourned July 26 and would read Washington’s letter July 29.
The Flying Camp stalls near 3,000
Congress had created the Flying Camp as a 10,000-man reserve to help defend the approaches to New York. Its July record repeatedly pushed the states to send men to New Jersey under Brig. Gen. Hugh Mercer and ordered temporary militia to remain until the full camp could relieve them.
The force existed on paper faster than it appeared in camp.
Washington said a return from Mercer showed “The Militia for the Flying Camp come in but slowly.” Only a little more than 3,000 had arrived.
That missing strength constrained Washington’s choices. He did not promise an attack. He said he would consider efforts against the enemy if the men arrived soon, the British position stayed the same and he could keep American posts guarded without placing too much at hazard.
As previously reported by The Dallas Express, Congress had declared “entire confidence” in Washington on July 23 and left the placement of troops at New York, the Flying Camp and Ticonderoga to his judgment.
Four days later, Washington’s report revealed the central problem. Congress could give him discretion over the Flying Camp, but the states still had to fill it.
Ten dollars could not buy three years
Washington also questioned whether Congress would extend a recruiting payment to officers who enlisted men for the new three-year army.
He acknowledged that paying officers for recruits might appear excessive, especially when some men could come from regiments already serving. He nevertheless argued that the allowance would give officers a direct reason to recruit aggressively instead of acting with efforts he described as “feint and languid.”
Even their strongest efforts might fail, Washington warned.
“It is objected that the bounty of ten Dollars is too low,” he wrote.
Short-term state service could offer men more money for five or six months than Congress offered for three years. Washington understood the obvious choice facing a potential recruit and asked why he would accept less money for a much longer commitment.
“I heartly wish a bounty in Land had been or could be given,” Washington wrote, saying it could produce “salutary consequences.”
Congress would extend the officer recruiting allowance on July 30. The deeper manpower problem would remain. The new nation needed soldiers willing to bind themselves to a war whose length no one could know.
British ships remain in the Hudson
The enemy’s strength continued to grow while Washington waited for men.
A report the previous evening placed eight ships in the offing, standing toward Sandy Hook. British warships and tenders remained upriver, although Washington said they had moved eight or 10 miles down the Hudson and had not tried to pass the Highland fortifications.
Local militia kept watch along the shores. Washington credited their vigilance and activity with preventing the British from landing and inflicting greater damage.
The restraint was not complete. “One poor Peasents Cot they plundered and then burnt,” Washington reported.
The single cottage captured the danger beneath the larger naval contest. British control of the river threatened forts and supply routes, but it also exposed ordinary homes and farms to men who could land, take what they wanted and leave by water.
Washington prepares an answer on the water
Washington was building ways to strike back.
Connecticut Gov. Jonathan Trumbull had sent two row galleys, and Washington expected another. One additional galley was complete in New York. Rhode Island Gov. Nicholas Cooke had not yet sent any.
Fire ships were progressing under Mr. Anderson’s direction, though Washington said the work moved slowly. He also prepared obstructions for the river channel near the works at the northern end of Manhattan.
Once everything was ready, Washington intended to determine whether it was practical to “destroy the Ships and Tenders above” and use the galleys to advantage.
The plan matched the situation. The British held powerful warships in the Hudson. Washington answered with smaller craft, burning vessels and barriers designed to trap or damage them. He did not have naval superiority, so he tried to make the river dangerous.
Officers warned about their example
Washington’s General Orders returned to the army’s daily discipline.
Complaints said officers assigned to attend men on fatigue and other duty had begun to “grow remiss.” Washington said he believed the failure came from inattention rather than design, but warned them to consider the effect of “so bad an example” on the soldiers.
He expected not to remind them again.
Two days earlier, Washington had warned that American soldiers fighting for liberty could not be less regular, watchful and sober than the British troops sent to defeat them. On July 27, he applied the same standard to officers.
Fatigue duty built and maintained the works on which New York’s defense depended. Officers who treated it casually taught their men to do the same.
Why it mattered
July 27 exposed the gap between declaring independence and defending it.
Congress could authorize a 10,000-man force, express complete confidence in Washington and leave strategy to his judgment. It could not make the missing soldiers appear. With British ships gathering around New York, the force Washington hoped to use had barely 3,000 men.
The recruiting dispute showed why. Men could earn more for months of state service than Congress offered for three years in the Continental Army. Washington’s proposed land bounty recognized that the country was asking soldiers to risk years of their lives for a nation that had existed for only three weeks.
The row galleys, fire ships and river obstructions showed American ingenuity. The unfinished Flying Camp showed ingenuity’s limit. Plans to strike the British required men, and even the officers already present had begun neglecting the hard labor that kept defenses ready.
On July 27, the question was no longer whether Americans had declared a country. It was whether they could build an army fast enough to keep it.
Tomorrow on Road to Independence
July 28, 1776: As sickness increased, Washington ordered regimental hospitals, required weekly returns on sick soldiers and warned that negligent adjutants would be named in General Orders and placed under arrest.
Follow the full Road to Independence series here.
Provided by Dallas Express
